main_verify" content="0fbe816ac62d0f3540f77744d40f34f2"/> Reason And Faith Together: Is it logical to be skeptical about everything?

Wednesday, December 17, 2014

Is it logical to be skeptical about everything?



The Following is a paper for one of my graduate classes:


            Aristotle said “All men by nature desire to know.”[1]  Sextus Empiricus in his work Outlines of Pyrrhonism  says that “Skepticism is the ability to find the opposites both of objects of experience and of objects of thought in any way whatever. Because the opposed things or reasoning’s have equal force, we are led first to suspension of judgment, and then to serenity.”[2]  If desiring to know ultimately means we desire to find out we can know nothing then Skepticism has a firm footing.  But to know that we can know nothing is knowing something and therefore undoes skepticism (more on this later).
            The purpose of this work is to determine the value of skepticism as it pertains to logically being able to know.  In this we will discuss defining terms, using reason and understanding.  If it is true that all men want to know and we cannot know anything what purpose does man have in pursuing knowledge?  If it is true that all men desire to know and we can know things what value does skepticism that leads to not knowing anything really have?  Throughout this paper these questions will be analyzed and a conclusion will be presented.
            Modern day skeptics are for the most part identical to ancient skeptics and this paper will include a discussion of both and why they are identical at the core.  It is certain that not all those who hold skepticism to be true have such stringent views of skepticism as the quote above (but does that change the rational conclusions a skeptic must find?).  In fact many who call themselves skeptics or align themselves with typical skeptic views recognize that if a skeptic turned his skepticism on his own positions he would constantly be stating one thing and then stating the opposite thing.  “Skepticism is itself a positive assertion about knowledge, and thus turned on itself cannot be held.”[3]  Shermer goes on to say that it may be more beneficial to change out the word skeptic with ‘rational’.  He uses an OED definition for the world rational: “Having the faculty of reasoning; endowed with reason” (p. 2420).[4]  He then goes on to say the best definition is one that uses both terms and we can call it the ‘rational skeptic’ definition, which he states to be: “One who questions the validity of particular claims of knowledge by employing or calling for statements of fact to prove or disprove claims, as a tool for understanding causality.”[5]  He goes on to explain “In other words… When we hear a fantastic claim we say, “that’s nice, prove it.” [6]
            Here is the problem with trying to define skepticism in any way other than what was stated above by Sextus.  If a rational skeptic has a problem with ‘fantastic’ claims by who’s definition is a claim fantastic?  Is he suggesting that claiming a potentiality and a probability that God exists is a fantastic claim?  Is any claim that cannot be proven empirically ‘fantastic’?  Who and what makes a thing ‘fantastic’ and by what standard do we measure or define a claim to be such?  Is it more rational to believe that everything that is known is known only because this universe exists and nothing outside of the universe does?  Or is it more rational to believe that there must be an unmoved mover a first cause for all things to exist?  Once we bring the conversation full circle and determine that a skeptic or a rational skeptic chooses to believe one thing verses another thing we are questioning man’s ability to know once again.  Without a standard what can man truly know?  Where does the skeptic or rational skeptic believe one can come up with terms such as good, bad, right wrong?  Shermer talks about being closed to only certain types of conversations and says this about conversations that have to do with concepts that can’t be known by looking at only the natural “When the non-skeptic says, “you’re just closed-minded to the unknown forces of the universe,” the skeptic responds: “We’re still trying to understand the known forces of the universe.” [7]  In limiting ones inquiry to the known forces of the universe one limits man to pursue the base verses the highest.  Aristotle said that the theoretical sciences were to be desired above all other sciences and that theology (the science that deals with the eternal, universal and unmovable) ought to be desired above all other theoretical sciences.  “Thus, while the theoretical sciences are more to be desired than the other sciences, this [theology] is more to be desired than the other theoretical sciences.”[8]  So, who’s right?  Are those who believe similarly to Aristotle, Aquinas and the like heading down the right path or are Sextus and Shermer getting closer to the truth?
            This statement appears to be true.  Whether we call a skeptic a skeptic, a rational thinker, a rational skeptic or the Easter Bunny we find that in concluding they cannot know things concerning certain topics, they choose to suspend judgment and live in ‘serenity’ or tranquility, they find themselves unable or unwilling to look at the questions that make man human, or rational.  But is this fair to say?
            Let’s take a look at the statement “We’re still trying to understand the known forces of the universe…” as a rebuttal to not looking outside the natural or known forces for possible answers.  Has the skeptic made a choice that limits them significantly?  In asking this question we must consider what has been conceptualized as modern or classical in philosophical inquiry.  As stated earlier, the skeptics views have been around since before Aristotle but the Aristotelian base is considered classical.
It appears to be that there is one fundamental difference between modern understanding and classical understanding.  This coincides with the difference between modern philosophy and classical.  In classical we assumed man’s ability to reason; in modern we don’t assume man’s ability to reason but instead his inability.  We only give man the nod after we have proven that he has this ability in himself.  But this leads to a fallacy.  As much as it appears that Descartes was sincere; it is impossible to get past this one fallacy.  I think there for I am or I think and I am; which suggests that he believes that he can reason through his own existence means he must still depend on something first something standard by which to measure his capability to reason through his statement.  In other words, his statement is still supposing he has the ability to reason through something and in supposing that, he must first believe that he has a reason to believe in his reason and that reason cannot be because of himself or man.  Therefore there must be a standard that makes his ability to reason valuable, this standard we call God; though some modern thinkers would like to call the standard natural processes.  But looking at the standard as this really leads to two possibilities.  1. Man’s evolution is separate from all other evolutionary forces and man’s ability to reason is still left to man’s ability to evolve which again leads to no value in his reasoning other than the value he gives himself.  The value man gives himself is subjective and not standard therefore valueless to anyone other than self; as it is subjected to 7 billion interpretations.   2.  Man’s evolution is in tune with all of nature and nature gave man his ability to reason therefore his purpose naturally is to perpetuate the species.  But this leaves us with no way to determine morality or the concepts of good and evil, except if nature has programed man to recognize these things because nature is conscious and reasons and deliberately programmed man on purpose; therefore once again making man subjected to a god of sorts. 
What about defining terms?  It doesn’t appear to make any sense how anyone believes they have a good reason to believe in their reason without there being a standard by which to measure their reason for conceptualizing terms like right, wrong, good, bad etc... Without there actually being a standard that is higher than man and man must submit to, man doesn't have any way to measure such terms except from personal opinion. But in recognizing it to be personal opinion the essence or nature of these terms are lost because they are subjective and not objective. As they are subjective, they become meaningless and thus are opinion and preference only. If they are opinion and preference then we ought to use 'it is my opinion or preference that such and such is this way or that.' We have no reason to use terms like right, wrong, good bad.

            But let us take this even further, how do we know we have reason and by what standard do we measure what is reasonable if there is no standard? In taking away the unmoved mover we have reasoned our way right out of any reason to hold value in our ability to reason because once again reason is subjective and not standard. Anything subjective is subjected to interpretation and thus its values lessons the more interpreters there are. As of today we have nearly 7 billion of them. Thus reason is a meaningless word as some may interpret it to mean we can know nothing and others may interpret it to mean that the Easter bunny is a peanut and a peanut is God therefore I must eat dry roasted peanuts. As is apparent, without a standard by which to measure what is reasonable the term reason loses all value.

            What gives terms value is being able to define them. To be able to define terms there must be parameters set up. To have parameters set up that mean anything they must be objective and not subjective parameters.   Aristotle makes an excellent argument in Book 11 chapters four through six of his Metaphysis.
Physics is in the same position as mathematics; for physics studies the attributes and the principles of the things that are, qua moving and not qua being… There is a principle in things, about which we cannot be deceived, but must always, on the contrary, recognize the truth – viz that the same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not be, or admit any other similar pair of opposites. … Those then who are to join in argument with one another must to some extent understand one another;… Therefore every word must be intelligible and indicate something, and not many things but only one… He then who says ‘this is and is not’ denies what he affirms, so that what the word signifies, he says it does not signify; and this is impossible.
He goes on to conclude this line of thinking with this:
While, then there is not proof of these things in the full sense, there is proof which may suffice against one who will make these suppositions. … If what is said by him is true, not even this itself will be true… that the same thing can at one and the same time both be and not be…. Further, it is not possible to affirm anything truly, this itself will be false- the assertion that there is no true affirmation.  But if a true affirmation exists, this appears to refute what is said by those who raise such objections and utterly destroy rational discourse.
The saying of Protagora is like the views we have mentioned; he said that man is the measure of all things, meaning simply that which seems to each man also assuredly is.  If this is so, it follows that the same thing both is and is not, and is bad and good and the contents of all other opposite statements are true…
… in pursuing the truth one must start from the things that are always in the same state and suffer no change.[9]

              If we break this down it is truly fascinating and logically unable to be proven false.  Physics and the natural sciences study things that are qua moving as opposed to qua being.  This means that these tools are not the best tools to discover the essence of a thing.  One must discover the essence of a thing, including terms to be able to have a discussion or dialogue with another.  Therefore man needs to find another tool to help him discover essence.  Aristotle goes on to explain that we must be able to define terms to have conversation; without this defining of terms we do not have the ability to converse on a level of understanding.
            If in a conversation the topic of love comes up and one person understands love to be a part of the very nature and essence of the Creator and another believes love to be whatever one can get out of any relationship with another human being; in this there is no true understanding of love between the two conversing.  The same goes for talking about Santa Clause or the Easter Bunny or the term bad or good, right or wrong etc….  If there is no true understanding of the very nature or essence of terms there is no point in having the conversation. 
            Aristotle understood two things that makes the skeptics view valueless.  The first thing Aristotle understood is that there is no possibility to call a thing a thing if it is subjective.  If good is good it can only be good because there is an unmoved standard that makes it good.  If it is as the skeptics holds to be true, then the thing that is called good is subjective and so is the term.  The other thing Aristotle understood that undoes skepticism is that a thing cannot both be and not be.  These two concepts go hand in hand.  God cannot both exist and not exist; right cannot be right and not right, good cannot be both good and not good etc…  As Aristotle says, things cannot be and be at the same time. 
            Aristotle also recognized that all sciences, including the theoretical sciences could not deal with these questions, save theology.  In all sciences, save theology we are dealing with the natural world that is not standard but is always moving.  Thus all we can study of these things through these sciences is the relationship to each other as they continue to move.  In this we can study what they are doing but not what their being or essence is.  When the skeptic determines that he cannot know a thing or doesn’t want to look at a thing because it is not a part of the natural and known he has taken a position that will not allow him to learn the essence of a thing or have the potential to learn the essence of a thing. He is only able to see how a thing relates as it moves around other things in motion.
In recognizing this both the ancient definition of skepticism and the modernists unwillingness to seriously look at the questions that would ultimately lead to meaning and value it becomes apparent that skepticism from all ages leads to intellectual suicide. 
One might argue that it is not intellectual suicide because one can find a personal value on a minute scale in what one finds him/herself doing.  But is this logically accurate or fallible?  What assumption does one have to make to find value on a personal level?  By what standard do they determine their minimal value?  How do they come up with what is of minimal value? 
If one assumes that they can have ‘minute’ value one is making a determination that there is some standard by which to measure this value.  If that standard is their own value system then the value they find is in themselves; thus saying something like this:  ‘I find value in myself because I find value in me, therefore I must have some value.’  Or they could say something like this: ‘I find value in me because I value that which society values, therefore that which society values is good.’  Again, in both instances, the good is determined by the individual and is circular.  Society is made up of men and men change therefore we are not dealing with the nature or essence of things but only how things move and work together.  To determine value one must find what is standard.  A two year old boy and a 40 year old man don’t hold the same values.  One gets completely upset, their entire day can be ruined, if they can’t find candy or mommy says ‘no more lollipops’, the other doesn’t care about lollipops.  The same can be said for society, as societies progress their values change.  To measure the essence and meaning of values against a changing system is logically unsound because one cannot know a thing and as discussed without having the ability to know a thing one doesn’t truly have any reason to talk about it or come to a conclusion or have a discussion about it. 
Does this typically stop people from talking about things or having opinions?  Absolutely not.  But does this make their opinions’ valid just because they have one?  One may argue that there is no God.  If there were a God one would be able to find indisputable physical evidence because how could something so powerful and involved in this world not be found?  For thousands of years man has searched for God and never has one been able to prove definitively that He exists.  What is more, look at all the wars and atrocities that have happened because of man’s belief in a god.  Therefore if there is a god he is bad and not worth my attention or, and more likely, He doesn’t exist. 
The above argument may look good but there is not proof in it.  In arguing that there must be empirical evidence to prove God the argument failed to provide such evidence that He doesn’t exist.  One may argue how can one argue a negative?  It would be like having to prove the Easter Bunny doesn’t exist empirically.  True, accept that when one talks about the Easter Bunny one is not making determinations of rightness or wrongness.  One may argue, that rightness or wrongness as it pertains to God is only a human construct and that rightness or wrongness are found in humanity alone.  If this is the argument we must go back to asking what is right, what is wrong?  Who makes these determinations and why do they?  Are they subjective or standard absolutes?  All these questions have been addressed previously.
To argue that man has behaved poorly because man has believed in a God is not logical.  Both men who believe in god and those who don’t believe in God have the potential of behaving poorly.  One cannot say it is because an individual believes in God they are behaving poorly.  If that same individual decided to not believe in God he could still behave poorly.  Some men who believe in God behave poorly and some men who don’t believe in God behave poorly.  Therefore man’s poor behavior cannot be God’s fault, nor does this poor behavior prove that God doesn’t exist.  One cannot say that because Hitler behaved poorly his dad never existed or the Easter bunny never existed.  Besides, as we have already discussed, who defines poor behavior if there is not standard by which to measure poor behavior. 
Typically, throughout this essay the terms standard, God, absolutes have been used to make the argument that there must be something higher that makes things so for things to be so and for man to be able to discuss and determine things.  This my no means proves one religious belief system over another; it does however give a good reason why one might take a look at the different belief systems out there.  It is important that one uses the proper tools in their search. 
The problem for the skeptic, be he modern or ancient, is that a skeptic doesn’t have the ability to know a thing, therefore has minimal ability to talk about a thing.  Once he decides to talk about a thing he has equal opportunity to change his mind because he couldn’t continue to be a skeptic if he held one view too long.  Another, even more problematic position for the skeptic is the inability to define things because everything is subjective.  In everything being subjective one will question their own existence, if reality is really there, etc….  Most don’t choose to take things this far, they choose to assume they have a reason to value what they do, but that very assumption is a logical fallacy without first recognizing a standard that give them the ability to logically make assumptions.


             



Bibliography

Aristotle: ed. Mckfon, Richard,  Aristotle’s Metaphysics. New York: Random House, 1941.
Shermer, Michael Why People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, Superstition, and Other Confusions of Our Time  W. H. Freeman. 1997,


[1] Aristotle: Richard Mckfon,  ed. Aristotle’s Metaphysics. (New York: Random House, 1941), 689. (980a 20)
[3] Michael ShermerWhy People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, Superstition, and Other Confusions of Our Time;  http://www.skeptic.com/about_us/manifesto.html
[4] Oxford English Dictionary
[5] Michael Shermer
[6] Ibid
[7] Ibid.
[8] Aristotle (1026a 20-25).
[9] Aristotle Metaphysics 1061b 20- 1063a 17.

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